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The Advocate and the
Expert-Counsel in
the Peno-Correctional Process
Sanford H. Kadish*
INTRODUCTION
The pattern of protective law governing the process of guilt determination constitutes as complex and elaborate a structure of limitations upon the exercise of governmental power as will be found
in our system of law. The definition of the prohibited conduct
may act only prospectively and must meet rigid standards of specificity; law enforcement officials are subject to an elaborate network of restraints in detecting crime, identifying the criminal,
and apprehending and detaining suspects; forms of accusation are
required to meet minimum standards in advising the accused of the
crime charged; strict rules of evidence protect the accused against
relevant but possibly prejudicial material; guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt in an open hearing; the right of the
accused to retain counsel, if not always to have one provided, is
universally recognized. Indeed, law enforcement people, restive
under the heavy apparatus of restraints, often protest that the law
has gone too far in weighing the scales in favor of the accused.
But the mood abruptly changes once guilt is finally adjudicated
and the pertinent questions turn on dispositions of the convicted
defendant within the framework of the relatively modem, beneficent systems designed to allow for tailoring of punishment to the
circumstances of the individual offender. The dominant theme then
becomes the freedom of the official to exercise his discretion rather
than the freedom of the individual from the exercise of unconfined power. As stated by the Illinois Supreme Court:
[A]ny person indicted stands before the bar of justice clothed with a
presumption of innocence and, as such, is tenderly regarded by the
law. Every safeguard is thrown about him..
. . After a plea of guilty
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. [I am indebted
to the Summer Research Training Institute in the Administration of Criminal Justice conducted at Madison, Wisconsin in 1960 under the sponsorship
of the Social Science Research Council for providing the opportunity to
think collectively about some of the problems discussed in this paper.]
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.. . instead of being clothed with a presumption of innocence they
are naked criminals, hoping for mercy but entitled only to justice.1

That this is not merely another Americanism is reflected in the observation of Mr. R. M. Jackson:
An English criminal trial, properly conducted, is one of the best
products of our law, provided you walk out of court before the sentence is given: if you stay to the end, you may find that it takes far
less time and inquiry to settle a man's prospects in life than it has taken to
find out whether he took a suitcase out of a parked motor
2
car.

It may be added that the sense of contrast may grow if you stay on
after sentence, through the determination by the court whether or
not to revoke probation, the determination by the parole board
whether, when, and under what conditions to release on parole
and later whether to revoke. Substantive legislative standards governing the decision to grant offenders conditional liberty on probation or parole commonly make no pretense at being other than
adjurations to act in the public interest. The final decision is commonly a calculated guess founded upon the judge's or board's
penological theories or social preferences. On the procedural level,
there is a comparable relaxation, for it was the United States Supreme Court which called attention to the necessary and inherent
differences between trial procedures and post-conviction procedures.' Hearings on sentence and release determinations are commonly attenuated interviews when they are given at all. Even in
revocation proceedings when the issue turns on the releasee's breach
of the imposed conditions, hearings are provided for only in some
jurisdictions; and where they are, many of the common traditional
marks of "fair" process, such as advance notification of the allegations made, opportunity to be present, to present evidence and to
cross examine, personally or through counsel, are absent.
An analysis of the development of ideas leading to the evolvement of this relaxation of substantive and procedural standards
and its defensibility in principle and in terms of practicalities is,
of course, beyond the range of this limited paper. It is necessary,
however, to make the point at the outset that the problem of the
right and role of legal representation in these post-conviction disposition proceedings-the immediate concern of this paper-is
only a single aspect of that larger problem.
The problems of the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings have been faced by courts, legislatures and parole boards.
1. People v. Riley, 376 Ill. 364, 368, 33 N.E.2d 872, 875, cert. denied,
313 U.S. 586 (1941).

2.

THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 211 (3d ed. 1960).
3. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949).
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Courts have been obliged to determine how long after conviction
and appeal the constitutional assurance of the right to counsel in
criminal proceedings extends; whether and to what extent due
process affords protection against denial of the right to counsel;
whether statutory grants of a hearing should be taken to imply the
right to be heard by counsel; and what content should be given to
the right where it is determined to exist. Legislatures have faced
the problem of determining whether representation by counsel in
probation and parole proceedings should be recognized, expressly
denied, or left to be determined by the court or agency empowered to determine the issue of disposition. And parole agencies
have had to determine whether the right should be extended and
how it should be administered. Underlying all of these decisions are problems central to the administration of justice in a system of individualized treatment determined by the discretionary
judgment of experts. What, if any, are the crucial differences between proceedings entailing the determination of guilt or innocence
and legal regularity, on the one hand, and, on the other, proceedings entailing the appropriate peno-correctional disposition of an
offender whose guilt has already been determined? What significance does it have that the legislature has determined the maximum
punishment for particular crimes, leaving it to courts or agencies
to determine, without substantial legal guide-lines, how much less
should be imposed on particular offenders and on what conditions?
Does the essentially discretionary clinical judgment involved in disposition determinations render the traditional attribute of fair
hearing, the right to be heard by counsel, particularly inappropriate? To what extent do traditional conceptions of fairness in procedure have any relevance in disposition determinations? Has the
lawyer any place in these matters? To what extent does recognition of right to counsel corrupt and distort the professional clinical
judgment of the charged agencies and tend to subvert the aims of
the whole system of individualized disposition? Finally, even if
there is some place for legal representation, do counterbalancing
considerations of practicality require that he be excluded?
In Part I of this paper I will attempt to describe the ways in
which legislatures, courts and agencies have responded to the issues posed for decision in each of the stages of the disposition
process from sentencing to final release, and show something of
the rationale upon which these decisions have been based. In Part
II, I will venture to deal generally with the considerations in virtue
of which it seems to me the role of counsel in these areas may
profitably be examined.

806

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

I.
A.

[Vol. 45: 803

STATE OF THE LAW

JUDICIAL SENTENCING

The exercise of the judicial sentencing function, encompassing
such determinations as whether to impose sentence or extend probation, the term and conditions of the probation order, or the
term, minimum or maximum, or both, of a prison sentence, has

not been made subject to the procedural requirements of a criminal trial. Without doubt, the prevailing practice is to accord an
opportunity to the offender to present factors in mitigation of sentence. But some statutes expressly make it discretionary with the
judge whether to hold even a modified hearing on mitigating circumstances alleged by the offender.4 And the use of ex parte pre-

sentence investigation reports, whose contents are only sometimes
made available to the offender, has largely muted the adversary

character of sentencing processes.' Nonetheless, the role of counsel at the sentencing stage has largely, though not consistently,
been recognized in the federal and state courts.'
In Townsend v. Burke,7 the Supreme Court can fairly be said
to have held that due process exacts the same requirements with
regard to the right to counsel at the sentencing stage as it does at
the trial Iself. There, petitioner, convicted on a plea of guilty to
4. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (1947); MONT. REV. CODES

ANN. § 94-7813 (1947); N.D. REV. CODE § 29-26-17 (1960); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 137.080 (Supp. 1959). But see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-35-12,
-13 (1953). See Thomas v. Teets, 220 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1955), where an
allegation in a habeas corpus petition was held not to state a due process
violation which alleged that the state court judge, empowered to determine whether capital punishment would be imposed, prevented the offender
from presenting further evidence in mitigation on the ground that his mind
was already made up.
5. The seminal case is, of course, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949). See generally Note, Employment of Social Investigation Reports in
Criminal and Juvenile Proceedings, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 702 (1958). However, some states have maintained greater adherence to the adversary process in sentencing. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1204, for example, requires evidence
in mitigation or aggravation of an offense to be given by witnesses in
court or by their dispositions. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203, which provides
for the preparation of a presentence report by a probation officer, requires
that the report be made available to counsel for the offender at least two
days prior to the sentencing hearing. The California courts have held that
these provisions require that no further evidence on sentencing be presented to the court other than through testimony in open court, since otherwise the offender would be denied the right given to him by these provisions to meet the evidence against him and present evidence in his own behalf. See, People v. Valdivia, 182 Cal. App. 2d 145, 5 Cal. Reptr. 832
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960); People v. Neal, 97 Cal. App. 2d 668, 218 P.2d 556
(Dist. Ct. App. 1950); People v. Giles, 70 Cal. App. 2d 872, 161 P.2d 623
(Super. Ct., L.A. 1945).
6. See Note, Right to Counsel at the Time of Sentence: New York's Forgotten Guarantee, 27 BROOKu.YN L. REV. 110 (1960).
7. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
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non-capital offenses, asserted a violation of due process in the acceptance of his plea and imposition of sentence upon him without
being advised of his right to counsel and without being offered assignment of counsel. The Court asserted, as a starting point, the
established principle with regard to assignment of counsel in noncapital cases in state courts that "the disadvantage from absence
of counsel, when aggravated by circumstances showing that it resulted in the prisoner actually being taken advantage of, or prejudiced, does make out a case of violation of due process."' Thereupon, in reviewing the proceedings following the guilty plea the
Court found elements of prejudice and overreaching in the facetiousness with which the sentencing judge conducted the proceeding
and in the arrant misreading by the judge of the petitioner's record
by which prior verdicts of acquittal were regarded as convictions.
Concluding that these were elements of substantial prejudice which
presence of counsel could have prevented, a due process violation
was found, the Court concluding:
[T]t is the careless or designed pronouncement of sentence on a foun-

dation so extensively and materially false, which the prisoner had no
opportunity to correct by the services which counsel would provide,
that renders the proceedings lacking in due process. . . . In this case,

counsel might not-have changed the sentence, but he could have taken
steps to see that the conviction and sentence were not predicated on
misinformation or misreading of court records, a requirement of fair
play which absence of counsel withheld from this prisoner. 9

While the Supreme Court has not passed on whether the right
to counsel in the federal courts under the sixth amendment extends to the sentencing stage, thereby obliging the court to appoint counsel in sentencing apart from a showing of prejudice, it
has on several occasions recognized the "invaluable aid" a lawyer
can render at this stage in calling the court's attention to mitigating circumstances which might result in a lighter penalty."0 The
lower federal courts have viewed the matter similarly.
There is then a real need for ounsel...

.Then is the opportunity

afforded for presentation to the Court of facts in extenuation of the

offense, or in explanation of the defendant's conduct; to correct any
errors or mistakes in reports of the defendants' past record; and in
short, to appeal to the equity of the Court. . ..
8. Id. at 739.

9. Id. at 741. While Mr. Justice Jackson's reasoning supports the view of

the holding expressed in the text, it may be plausibly argued that the heart
of the error was the misbehavior of the sentencing judge rather than the
absence of counsel. Would the Court have held differently if assigned

counsel had been present but had failed to correct the judge?
10. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 178-79 (1946).
11. Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1950).
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Indeed, the very latitude of the power possessed by the sentencing
court has been suggested as augmenting, rather than reducing, the
need for representation at this stage.' 2 In consequence, the federal
courts have held that the guarantee of the sixth amendment, expressed in Powell v. Alabama 3 as the right to "the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings," extends to the sentencing stage of the criminal process.' 4
The federal courts' interpretation of this right has not been consistent. Though only one court appears to have had occasion to
deal squarely with the refusal of a court to appoint counsel at sentencing for an indigent who makes the demand,' 5 the language
of the federal decisions renders it likely that a constitutional violation would be found. The situation giving rise to most of the decisions is that in which counsel (appointed, for the most part) who
represented the offender at the plea or at the trial, fails to appear
with him at the sentencing. The courts have generally remanded
for resentencing in this circumstance on the ground that sentencing
without the presence of the offender's counsel violates the sixth
amendment. 6 On the issue of prejudice to the offender, some
courts have held that it is presumed, 7 while others have suggested
that at least the possibility of prejudice must be demonstrated by
the offender." Mere physical presence of substituted counsel who
12. See Kent v. Sanford, 121
J., dissenting). The dissenting
States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.
kind of assistance that counsel

F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1941) (Hutcheson,
view later prevailed in Martin v. United
1950). For a trial judge's exposition of the
can render his client in sentencing determi-

nations, see Pharr, On Sentencing: What a Judge Expects from Defense
Cofunsel, 1 PRc. LAw. 76 (Oct. 1955).

13. 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
14. See, e.g., Nunley v. United States, 283 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1960);
Gadsden v. United States, 223 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Davis v. United
States, 226 F.2d 834 (8th Cir. 1955); McKinney v. United States, 208
F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th
Cir. 1950); Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1946).
15. Stidham v. Swope, 82 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1949). Here petitioner alleged that he was induced to waive counsel and plead guilty in return
for the federal prosecutor's representation of a lenient sentence. When the
judge imposed a four year sentence, he moved for appointment of counsel prior to entry of judgment. Thereupon the court set aside the four year
sentence and imposed one for five years. Chief Judge Denman of the
Ninth Circuit found the allegations sufficient to state a violation of the right
to counsel.
16. See Gadsden v. United States, 223 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1950); Willis v. Hunter,
166 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1948); Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F.2d 507 (9th
Cir. 1946); Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1946).
17. See Martin v. United States, supra note 16, at 227: "[T]he nature
and possibilities of this important stage of the proceedings are such as make
the absence of counsel at this time presumably prejudicial."
18. See Walton v. United States, 202 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Here
the absence of counsel was held to be "inconsequential error" since the
offender had been represented during the sentencing by counsel who was
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did not have opportunity to prepare has been held a denial of the
constitutional right to effective representation, 9 although postponement of sentencing by counsel to permit him to collect data
and submit it by memorandum, even though he was absent at sentencing, was held to fulfill the "spirit and purpose of the constitutional mandate." 20 The issue of waiver has been variously treated,
some courts appearing to require the same affirmative showing
necessary at earlier stages,2 ' others finding a failure to raise the
issue of the absence of trial counsel on the allocution sufficient to
waive the right.m
Recognition of the right to counsel at sentencing in the state
courts has been less even. So far as concerns the limitations of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the federal
courts have dealt with collateral attacks based on absence of counsel at sentencing on the same level as lack of counsel during
trialY3 The fifth circuit has held death sentences in violation of
due process where trial counsel was not present because of a failure of the offender's message to reach his counsel,24 and where
counsel was not present for lack of notification that sentencing was
to take place.' The same court held a habeas corpus petition to
state a meritorious claim which asserted, without more, that petitioner's counsel was absent at the time the death sentence was imposed. 21 In non-capital cases, where due process imposes less exacting requirements, the issue of the absence of counsel at sentencing appears to turn on whether petitioner's right to the assistance of his own counsel was denied, as by the court proceeding to
absent only when the court recalled the matter fifteen minutes later to
correct an inadvertent error in names.
19. Gadsden v. United States, 223 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Cf. Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1946).

20. Walton v. United States, 202 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

21. Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1950); Wilfong v.
Johnston, 156 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1946).
22. Batson v. United States, 137 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1943); Errington
v. Hudspeth, 110 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638

(1941). See Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1939) where it
was held that a mere allegation in a habeas corpus petition that trial counsel was not present at sentencing without an assertion of denial of the right
to the assistance of counsel was inadequate. "The burden rested upon petitioner to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his
constitutional right to counsel." 108 F.2d at 732. Where the offender
waives counsel and enters a plea of guilty, the waiver presumptively carries
over to sentencing. Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 834 (8th Cir. 1955);
Creel v. Hudspeth, 110 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1940). But see Zeff v. Sanford, 31 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ga.), affd, 114 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1940).

23. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
24. Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ga.), a/fd, 131 F.2d
110 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 759 (1943).
25. Ellis v. Ellisor, 239 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1956).
26. Houston v. Ellis, 252 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1958).
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sentence without awaiting counsel's return,27 or whether the absence of counsel was simply the result of a failure to appoint at
sentencing.2 s
State decisions have varied on the extent to which the right to
the assistance of counsel at trial, as that right is defined by state
law, is applicable as well to the sentencing stage. One can identify,
however roughly, four principal views:
(1) California has interpreted its constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to appear and defend with counsel in "criminal
prosecutions" 29 as extending unqualifiedly to the pronouncement
of judgment and sentence. Therefore, where the defendant appears
for sentencing without counsel, the court may not proceed without
advising the defendant of his right to the assistance of counsel and
satisfying itself that the defendant has understandingly waived
that right. Failure to do so is error, apparently without regard to a
showing of prejudice, whether the judgment and sentence are imposed directly after verdict, 30 or after a revocation of a suspension
of imposition of sentence.3 1 Unlike the rationale adduced by the
federal courts, which turns on the value of counsel in appealing to
the "equity" of the court on behalf of a more lenient sentence, the
California Supreme Court has focused rather upon the need for
counsel to establish legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced and to protect against an unwitting running of the time
allowed for an appeal.32
(2) In New Jersey, the state constitutional provision for counsel
appears to have been interpreted similarly to the sixth amendment.
A person charged with a crime in any court is entitled to be advised of his right to counsel and of his privilege to have counsel
assigned ;33 moreover, the duties of assigned counsel extend
through, and terminate after, sentencing. 4 In a recent opinion,
the appellate division held that failure to notify defendant of his
right to the assistance of counsel at the time sentence was imposed
and to appoint counsel for him in the absence of waiver constituted
27. Green v. Robbins, 120 F. Supp. 61 (D. Me.), a/I'd, 218 F.2d 192

(1st Cir. 1954). On appeal the state did not contest the substance of the
trial court's due process findings.

28. Billman v. Burke, 74 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Pa. 1947), aff'd, 170 F.2d
413 (3d Cir. 1948). But see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
29. CALIF. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
30. In re Boyce, 51 Cal. 2d 699, 336 P.2d 164 (1959); People v. Havel,
134 Cal. App. 2d 213, 285 P.2d 317 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
31. In re Roberts, 40 Cal. 2d 745, 255 P.2d 782 (1953); Ex parte Levi,
39 Cal. 2d 41, 244 P.2d 403 (1952); People v. Fields, 88 Cal. App. 2d 30,
198 P.2d 104 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
32. See Ex parte Levi, 39 Cal. 2d 41, 46, 244 P.2d 403, 405-06 (1952).
33. N.J. RULES 1:12-9(a) (Supp. 1960).
34. N.J. RULES 1:12-9(b) (Supp. 1960).

19611

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

jurisdictional error correctible by collateral attack.' The grant of
habeas corpus was reversed and the matter remanded by the supreme court, 6 not on the ground that the right to the assistance
of counsel does not extend to sentencing,3 7 but because petitioner neither alleged nor proved (a) that he did not understandingly
waive counsel at sentence (he had waived counsel prior to pleading) and (b) that his rights could not have been fairly protected
without the aid of counsel. On the latter point, the court distinguished between the role of counsel at trial and upon sentencing, pointing out that while in the former case "prejudice may quite readily
appear" from the absence of counsel, the same can not be said of
the sentence stage.
We do not belittle the role of counsel at that stage. Rather we stress
that our practice is designed to assure an impartial presentation of pertinent material and frequently is far more productive for a defendant
than are the efforts of counsel.. . .Although the probation report
does not supersede the role of counsel, surely the justice of a sentence
no longer rests so heavily upon his contribution.38

(3) In New York, it is now clear that the state constitutional
guaranty of the right "to appear and defend in person and with
counsel" in "any trial in any court"3 9 precludes deprivation of defendant's right to counsel of his choice at the time of sentence."'
However, there is no duty to appoint counsel at the sentencing as
there is at trial. The right to appointment of counsel is not constitutional, and the statute extends the duty only at the trial."1 Furthermore, the mere absence of defendant's counsel of choice at
42
sentencing does not constitute a violation of any New York right.
This New York view is fairly representative of the holding of
many state courts in the typical case where defendant's counsel of
choice fails to appear at sentencing: the right to counsel of choice
extends to sentencing, though perhaps not to appointment except
in grave cases; but the absence of counsel is not error unless it
35. Jenkins v. State, 57 N.J. Super. 93, 154 A.2d 29 (App. Div. 1959).
36. State v. Jenkins, 32 NJ. 109, 160 A.2d 25 (1960).
37. The Supreme Court expressly asserted that it did. 32 NJ. at 112,
160 A.2d at 27.
38. 32 N.J. at 114-15, 160 A.2d at 28.
39. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
40. People v. Hannigan, 7 N.Y.2d 317, 165 N.E.2d 172, 197 N.Y.S.
2d 152 (1960).
41. People v. Hasenstab, 283 App. Div. 433, 128 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1954);
La Mere v. Jackson, 9 App. Div. 2d 843, 192 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1959). Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires appointment of counsel on arraignment.
42. People v. DeMaio, 303 N.Y. 939, 105 N.E.2d 629 (1952), affirming
279 App. Div. 596, 107 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1951).
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appears that there is no waiver43 and active prejudice is shown."

(4)

Finally, there are several decisions which assert that the pro-

nouncement of sentence is no part of the trial within the intendment of state constitutions 45 or statutes 46 guaranteeing the right to
counsel in criminal trials. Whether these decisions mean, however, that as a consequence an offender may be deprived of the
privilege of representation by his counsel of choice is doubtful;
certainly the holdings requireno such proposition.
B.

ADMINISTRATIVE SENTENCING-PAROLE ELIGIBILITY

Determinations by Boards of Parole whether and when to release the offender on parole are in some measure equivalent to
the sentencing determinations of the judge. Determining when during the offender's term he shall be released approximates the judicial setting of a term of imprisonment. The only difference is the
time of the determination: the judicial sentence determines the
range of imprisonment at the outset; the parole decision determines the length of sentence after it is served. Moreover, the administrative decision to release on supervised and conditional parole
43. E.g., Drolet v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 382, 140 N.E.2d 165
(1957) (fair to assume that counsel's unexplained absence, in the circumstances, due to prearrangement with defendant); Schwartz v. State, 103
Miss. 711, 60 So. 732 (1913) (defendant failed to protest counsel's unexplained absence). Sometimes the waiver concept is applied when there is
no basis for a finding of prearrangement, as where the court proceeds to
sentence only after an unsuccessful search for defendant's counsel (Wilson
v. State, 32 Ga. App.77, 122 S.E. 640 (1924)) or where the counsel's absence arises from the prosecutor having overlooked counsel's request to
notify him of the time of sentencing (Welch v. State, 63 Ga. App. 277,
11 S.E.2d 42 (1940)).
44. Whitehurst v.State, 3 Ala. App. 88, 57 So. 1026 (1912) (sentence
in absence of defendant's counsel may cause grave injustice, but none present since court himself polled jury and reduced sentence from six to five
years when he became aware of counsel's absence); see McCall v. State,
262 Ala.414, 79 So. 2d 51 (1955).
Screven v. State, 169 Ga. 384, 150 S.E. 558 (1929) (unexplained absence of defendant's counsel at sentencing no grounds for reversal when
rights and interests of accused not affected).
Commonwealth v. Polens, 327 Pa. 554, 556-57, 194 A. 652, 653 (1937)
(counsel absent at sentence for capital offense, but since he was present at
hearing for determination of degree of guilt and appropriate penalty,
there was no harm to defendant). However, "the practice of sentencing a
defendant in the absence of his counsel is most unusual and is hereby condemned ...... See also Commonwealth ex rel. De Simone v. Cavell, 185
Pa. Super. 131, 138 A.2d 688 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Berry v. Tees,
177 Pa. Super. 126, 110 A.2d 794 (1955).
State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d 756 (1953) (absence of counsel at sentencing not prejudicial since form of jury verdict made imposition
of death sentence mandatory).
45. Powers v.Langlois, 153 A.2d 535 (R.I. 1959) (constitutional provision substantially similar to that of California, see note 29 supra).
46. State v. Hughes, 170 La. 1063, 129 So. 637 (1930); Ex parte Oliver, 156 Tex. Crim. 235, 240 S.W.2d 316 (1951).
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is basically the same as the judicial decision to stay imprisonment

during supervised and conditional probation. Furthermore, decisions on both levels turn on a discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and
what he may become rather than simply what he has done." Nonetheless, there is no observable disposition to extend constitutional
or statutory guarantees to the right of counsel in criminal proceedings to the administrative determination of whether to release on

parole. 48 Apart from the occasional statutory sport, like the Montana statute which assures the privilege of representation by counsel at parole release hearings, 9 statutes rarely address themselves
to the role of counsel, except occasionally, as in Minnesota, to allow the Parole Commission to decline to hear oral presentations

by attorneys." The argument often made in revocation cases that
the grant of a right to a hearing" encompasses the right to be

heard by counsel 2 does not appear to have been made. As a
matter of law, the privilege of counsel is at the free option of the

parole board. What boards actually do is indicated by replies to a
questionnaire circulated by the Reporter for the Model Penal
47. Compare Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-412 (1956): The Board
may release on parole when it appears "that there is reasonable probability
that the applicant will live and remain at liberty without violating the
law," with AR=Z. R-EV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1657 (1956): The court may place
the defendant upon probation, "if it appears that there are circumstances in
mitigation of the punishment, or that the ends of justice will be subserved
thereby." Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.18 (1944): The Parole Commission shall not grant parole unless there is a reasonable probability that on
parole the defendant "will live and conduct himself as a respectable and
law abiding person, and that his release will be compatible with his own
welfare and the welfare of society," with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.01(3)
(Supp. 1960): The court may grant probation "If it appears . . . that the
defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct
and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that
the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law ..
48. I have found no cases in point, although it would seem to follow
from the sense of the holdings that revocation procedures are no part of
a criminal prosecution. See discussion infra.
49. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-9835 (Supp. 1959).
50. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 637.06 (Supp. 1960). But see MINN. STAT.
§8 611.12(3), 611.13(3) (1957) authorizing the committing judge to
order the public defender (of Hennepin and Ramsey counties) to appear
before the Parole or Pardon Board on behalf of any applicant for pardon or
parole.
51. Statutes usually afford some kind of hearing on parole determinations. See, e.g., Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-411 (1956). The prisoner
whose minimum term has expired "shall be given an opportunity to appear
and apply for release upon parole . . . ." IDAHo CODE ANN. § 20-223
(Supp. 1959). "The board shall have the prisoner appear before it and shall
interview him." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2802 (1947). The board "shall
conduct open hearings .... "
52. See discussion infra.
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Code-legal counsel is permitted either in preparation for the
hearing or at the hearing itself in some 18 states. 3
C.

COMMITMENT REDETERMINATIONS-REVOCATIONS

It was suggested that release determinations of parole boards
share much in common with judicial sentencing determinations.
Similarly, determinations to revoke a conditional release and commit, whether made by the court in revoking probation or by a
board in revoking parole, have important elements in common
with the criminal trial itself. In each case the primary focus is upon
the past behavior of the person: in the former case, whether he
in fact violated the standards of conduct (the conditions) of the
release order; in the latter, whether he violated the standards of the
criminal law. There are, of course, differences, since discretion to
revoke is sometimes thought to be as wide as discretion to grant
probation and is therefore not necessarily confined to proven
breaches of conditions, as conviction is confined to proven breaches
of the law." But on any view the primary focus, whether exclusive or not, is on past behavior. The right to counsel has often
been dealt with differently in probation and parole revocations. It
is convenient, therefore, in describing what the courts have done
to treat these separately.
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.10, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
54. See, e.g., opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Bums v. United
States, 287 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1932):
Probation is thus conferred as a privilege and cannot be demanded as
a right. It is a matter of favor, not of contract. There is no requirement that it must be granted on a specified showing ...
There is no suggestion in the statute that the scope of the discretion
conferred for the purpose of making the grant is narrowed in providing
for its modification or revocation. . . . The question in both cases is
whether the court is satisfied that its action will subserve the ends of
justice and the best interests of both the public and the defendant.
However, a competing and perhaps more widespread view is that probation may be properly revoked only for breach of the conditions of its original grant. See, e.g., Hollandsworth v. United States, 34 F.2d 423, 428 (4th
Cir. 1929):
The power of the court to revoke a probation and sentence the probationer may not be exercised unless it is made to appear that he has
failed to comply with the terms and conditions prescribed for him. It
is not conceivable that Congress intended to confer upon the court the
power to call back the defendant at any time within five years after
conviction and imprison him, no matter how blameless his conduct
may have been during the interim, or how strictly he may have observed the terms of his probation.
See also United States v. You, 159 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1947); Manning v.
United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1947); Mankowski v. United States,
148 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1945); In the Matter of Maguth, 103 Cal. App.
572, 284 Pac. 940 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930); State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553,
150 P.2d 970 (1944). Occasionally an order of revocation has been reversed where it plainly appeared that there was no violation of the conditions imposed. See, e.g., United States v. Van Riper, 99 F.2d 816 (2d Cir.
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ProbationRevocation
Justice Cardozo, in Escoe v. Zerbst,5 5 was the author of highly

influential dicta to the effect that neither due process nor the specific constitutional guarantees protecting the accused in a criminal

trial extend to probation revocation: since probation comes as an
act of grace to one duly convicted of crime, Congress is free to impose such conditions as it deems wise, including dispensing with

notice and hearing on revocation of the favor."0 But what Justice
Cardozo was unable to evoke from the Constitution, he felt justi-

fied in extracting from the provision of the probation statute that af-

ter arrest the probationer "shall forthwith be taken before the
court.57 That language was interpreted as requiring such notice
and hearing as will "enable an accused probationer to explain away

the accusation." While this does not require "a trial in any strict or
formal sense," it does require "an inquiry so fitted in its range to
the needs of the occasion as to justify the conclusion that discretion has not been abused by the failure of the inquisitor to carry
the probe deeper."5 "
Adjudicating within this framework, the federal courts have
declined to invalidate revocation orders where the probationer was
dealt with without counsel. These courts take the view that "the

statute does not require that a probationer be represented by
counsel at an inquiry relative to the proposed revocation of proba-

tion."59 The test is whether the court has abused its discretion in
1938). Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' view, it may be added, is less plausible
under the terms of the amended federal probation statute which specifies the
grounds of an arrest warrant, as the former act did not, as the "violation
of probation occurring during the probation period." 18 U.S.C. § 3653
(1958). But see United States v. Squillante, 144 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (refusal to terminate probation though sole condition of payment of
fine and tax complied -with); United States v. Quails, 182 F. Supp. 213,
216 (N.D. Ill. 1960):
A revocation, of course, need not be based upon the violation of specific terms of the probation ...
The determinative question is whether the probationer's conduct has
been inconsistent with a bona fide effort to accomplish his own rehabilitation.
Kaplan v. United States, 234 F.2d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1956):
The appellant's argument that he violated none of the specific
terms of his probation and that the terms were never modified would
not, even if true, be persuasive. The determinative question is whether
the conduct of the probationer was inconsistent with his duties as
such. One on probation is not at liberty; he is in law and in fact in the
custody and under the control of the court granting probation.
55. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
56. Id. at 492-93.
57. 43 Stat. 1260 (1925). It has now been amended to read: "As speedily
as possible after arrest the probationer shall be taken before the court.
." 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1958).
58. 295 U.S. at 493.
59. Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d 412, 415 (8th Cir. 1946). See

816

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45: 803

conducting the proceeding-failure to appoint counsel is itself
no such abuse.6" Failure to permit probationer to be represented
by his own counsel probably would be such an abuse;0 ' whether
failure to appoint counsel upon request may be an abuse of discretion, at least in circumstances of an inexperienced and ignorant
probationer, apparently no court has determined. One factor of
relevance suggested by courts is whether counsel could have been
helpful to the probationer; where he admits the violation and there
are no disputed issues, a finding of abuse of discretion is not
likely.62
Most state courts have, as might be expected, followed the lead
of the Supreme Court in Escoe v. Zerbst in regarding revocation
proceedings as not subject to the constitutional procedural guarantees applicable in criminal prosecutions, even as regards the
right to a hearing and confrontation.6 3 Absent any contrary statutory provision,6 4 therefore, there is no right to hearing or counsel
in revocation proceedings. In those few states, however, which have
held these constitutional guarantees applicable to probation revocation, the right to counsel, or at least the right to be represented
by retained counsel, has a constitutional base.65
also Kelley v. United States, 235 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1956); United States
v. Huggins, 184 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1950); Gillespie v. Hunter, 159 F.2d
410 (10th Cir. 1947); Cupp v. Byington, 179 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Ind.
1960); United States v. George, 48 F. Supp. 200 (W.D. La. 1942).
60. Kelley v. United States, supra note 59, at 45; Gillespie v. Hunter,
supra note 59, at 411.
61. See United States v. George, supra note 59, at 213.
62. See Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d 412, 415 (8th Cir. 1946).
63. In re Davis, 37 Cal. 2d 872, 236 P.2d 579 (1951). California, however, does regard the sentencing stage as part of the criminal trial. See
text accompanying notes 29-32 supra. Thus, where probation is accompanied by suspension of imposition of sentence (as opposed to suspension
of execution of an imposed sentence), although probation may be revoked
without hearing and counsel, sentence may not then be imposed in their
absence. See Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937) (no point
made of California distinction between suspension of imposition and execution of sentence); In re Levi, 39 Cal. 2d 41, 244 P.2d 403 (1952); People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912). A saturation of
cases appears in Annot., Right to notice and hearing before revocation of
suspension of sentence, parole, conditional pardon, or probation, 29 A.L.R.
2d 1074 (1953). See also Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 311, 322-34 (1959).
64. Indeed, some statutes expressly dispense with notice and hearing at
revocation. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 247.26 (1949) ("without notice");
MINN. STAT.
§ 610.39 (1957)
("without notice"); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 549.090 (1949) ("without notice"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4321
(1953) ("without any further proceedings").
65. Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 168 Pac. 713 (1917); Christiansen
v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945); State v. Zolantakis, 70
Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044 (1927); State v. O'Neal, 147 Wash. 169, 265 Pac.
175 (1928). See Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 685, 32 So. 2d 607, 609 (1947);
Mason v. Cochran, 209 Miss. 163, 46 So. 2d 106 (1950); People v. Valle,
7 Misc. 2d 125, 164 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1957).
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A very few statutes expressly grant probationer a right to be
represented by his counsel at revocation proceedings. 0 For the
rest, the decisions turn on whether the more or less explicit provisions for hearing (found in most statutes) 67 encompass the right
to the assistance of counsel. In New York, for example, the court
of appeals has construed a statute requiring "an opportunity to be
heard" at probation revocation 68 to contemplate notice of the violation charged and opportunity to attack or deny the charge. 9
Accordingly, it has been held "elementary" that the probationer
be given an opportunity to obtain counsel, if requested.7" Consistent with the federal view, this has not been held to impose an
obligation on the court to inform probationer of his right to counsel 7' or to appoint counsel in his behalf.72 Likewise in Illinois,
the provision requiring the probationer to be "brought before the
court" (as well as the court's sense of "justice") merited reversal
of a probation revocation where the court took evidence and issued its order despite knowledge that the attorney who probationer
thought was representing him declined to serve. The court said:
We think that justice required that he be given some opportunity to
determine whether he had an attorney and if he did not have one, to
obtain one. On the other hand if, for some reason, the court did
not see fit to continue the hearing, the defendant should have been
offered the services of the Public Defender.73

2.

ParoleRevocation

The predominant view of the federal courts in probation revocation proceedings-that neither the specific constitutional guar66. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2713 (Supp. 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.06
(Supp. 1960) ("opportunity to be fully heard on his behalf in person and
by counsel"); Tm'NN. CODE
ANN. § 66-16-32 (1949).

ANN. §

80-2907 (1955);

ALASKA Co, P. LAws

67. For citations of statutes see Note, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 311, 323-24,

nn.89-93 (1959).
68. N.Y. CODE

CRuM. PROC. § 935 (1958).
69. People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d 235 (1953).

70. See to the same effect State v. Burnette, 173 N.C. 734, 737, 91 S.E.
364, 366 (1917); State v. Nowak, 91 Ohio App. 401, 406, 108 N.E.2d
377, 380, appeal dismissed, 157 Ohio St. 525, 106 N.E.2d 82 (1952).
71. People v. St. Louis, 3 App. Div. 2d 883, 161 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1957).
72. People v. Valle, 7 Misc. 2d 125, 164 N.Y.S.2d 67 (CL Spec. Sess.
1957). Nunz v. Monroe County COurt, 5 Misc. 2d 592, 150 N.Y.S. 2d 698

(Monroe COunty Ct. 1956). Neither, of course, is a court precluded from

appointing counsel. A recent questionnaire revealed that 23 of the New

York judges responding always assign counsel before or during revocation
proceedings, 4 usually assign counsel, 7 usually do not and 1 never does.
See Note, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 311, 329 n.138 (1959).
73. People v. Burrell, 334 Ill. App. 253, 258, 79 N.E.2d 88, 90 (1948).

The court was admittedly influenced by the contribution an attorney could

have made in resolving the "doubts and ambiguities" in the testimony con-

cerning the allegation of purse snatching which was the ground of revocation.
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antees appropriate to criminal trials nor the command of procedural justice of the due process clause are applicable-has, consistently enough, been extended to parole revocation matters as
well. As with probation revocation, the moving considerations
have been that the parolee has a status of a privileged inmate,
enjoying no right to a continuation of that status and that, in any
event, he received his constitutional protection at the trial.7" It
follows, of course, that there is no constitutional right to counsel.
As with probation revocation, the bulk of federal litigation has
turned upon the extent to which a right to counsel can be implied
from the statutory requirement of a parole revocation hearing.
That some courts have drawn wider implications in parole than in
probation revocation proceedings is no doubt attributable to the
fact that the hostility to counsel exhibited by some boards has furnished the occasion to do so. In Fleming v. Tate,76 for example,
parolee sought habeas corpus from a commitment under a parole
revocation at which the federal parole board denied the requests
of parolee's attorney to appear, and of his employer to testify, in
his behalf. In the face of settled board practice of over 35 years of
not allowing counsel to appear or testimony to be offered, the
77
court found that the statutory grant of "an opportunity to appear"
before the board carried with it the right to appear through counsel and to present evidence; even though no obligation to appoint
counsel could be properly implied, these two features constituted
"the basic characteristics of our whole system of administration of
justice. '78 A year after the decision, Congress adopted the holding by amending the District Code to provide that the parolee
"may be represented by counsel" at the revocation hearing.7" In
a subsequent decision, Moore v. Reid,8" the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia carried the Tate holding one step further
by holding that in the absence of express advice to the parolee of
his right to the assistance of counsel of his choice, no waiver could
be implied from his participation at the hearing without counsel.
74. E.g., Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923); Hiatt v. Campagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd without opinion by equally divided court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950); United States ex rel. Harris v. Ragen,
177 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1948); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir.
1946); United States ex rel. Nicholson v. Dillard, 102 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.
1939). But see Flandrick, Revocation of Conditional Liberty-California and the Federal System, 28 So. CAL. L. REV. 158, 170 (1955).
75. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Campagna, supra note 74; Fleming v. Tate, supra
note 74.
76. 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
77. D.C. CODE § 24-206 (1940).
78. Fleming v. Tate, supra note 74, at 850.
79. Act of July 17, 1947, 61 Stat. 378, 379, D.C. CODE, § 24-206
(1951).
80. 246 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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The federal parole statute reads in all substantial respects the
way the District of Columbia provision read at the time Fleming
v. State was decided, providing that the retaken prisoner "shall be
given an opportunity to appear before the Board.""1 In a recent
case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, therefore,
interpreted that statute in the same way it interpreted the District
Statute. 2 Other federal courts, however, have rejected the Dis,trict of Columbia interpretation, declining to upset the settled federal parole board practice since 1910 of denying parolee the right
to appear through counsel. The fifth circuit found support for its
view in the 1948 revision of the criminal code which added to the
parole provision that the appearance should be before the Board,
"a member thereof or an examiner designated by the Board." "This
change," the court concluded, "cuts deeply into the idea that the
appearance is to be a trial. An examiner may conduct it now, and
it would seem that the taking of the testimony of the prisoner,
and perhaps his witnesses, is alone contemplated." 'ss The court
apparently did not deem it significant to advert to the fact that the
District of Columbia provision expressly authorizing counsel, has
the same language. More recently, other courts have reasoned that
the failure of Congress to include a provision for counsel in the
1948 revision of the criminal code, after its action the previous
year in amending the District of Columbia law expressly so to provide, and its failure to do so again in 1951 when it enacted the
District of Columbia Code of 1951, including the 1947 amendment, is evidence of its intention to establish a different requirement under the federal statute. s4 Why Congress should have intended an arbitrary classification which would allow District parolees the right to counsel but deny that right to other federal
parolees before the same Board challenges the imagination; one
would have thought that the statutory interpretation argument cuts
81. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1958).
82. Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
83. Hiatt v. Campagna, 178 F.2d 42, 46 (5th Cir. 1949), affd without
opinion by equally divided court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950).
84. Washington v. Hagan, 183 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Pa.), aftd, 287 F.2d

332 (3d Cir. 1960); Hock v. Hagan, 190 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Pa. 1960);
United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, 190 F. Supp. 689 (D. Conn.
1960); Poole v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Lopez v.
Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959). In the last cited case the
court applied the same rule to a prisoner conditionally released as of right
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1958) after serving his sentence less deduction for good behavior, in view of 18 U.S.C. § 4164 (1958) providing that
prisoners so released should be treated as released on parole. See 108 U.
PA. L. REv. 423 (1960). Thus far, apparently, only one court has found

the District of Columbia view persuasive. Cannon v. Stucker, Civil No.
19822 (E.D. Mich. June 1960).
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the other way. 5 In a recent opinion Judge Goodrich also disagreed with the District of Columbia view of the federal statute,
but declined to rest his conclusion on the legislative history argument."6 He rather rested it on the fifty year old practice of denying representation by counsel which, in his judgment was
right because this matter of whether a prisoner is a good risk for release on parole or has shown himself not to be a good risk, is a disciplinary matter which by its very nature should be left in the hands
of those charged with the responsibility for deciding the question.
• . . The period of contentious litigation is over when a man accused
of crime is tried, defended, sentenced and, if he wishes, has gone
through the process of appeal. Now the problem becomes one of an
attempt at rehabilitation. The progress of that attempt must be measured, not by legal rules, but by the judgment of those who make it
their professional business. So long as that judgment is fairly and
honestly exercised we think there is no place for lawyer representation
and lawyer opposition in the matter of revocation of parole.

Judge Goodrich made clear that the statute does require a "fair
hearing"; the point was that blanket refusal in all cases to permit
representation by counsel does not render the hearings unfair."
Another argument presented on several occasions in support of
the right to counsel in federal parole revocation proceedings rests
on the language of section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act 8 which accords the right to be represented by counsel to
anyone compelled personally to appear before any agency or representative and to any party in any agency proceeding.' The ar85. The fact that the erratic working of legislative processes has produced some disparities in parole matters between federal and district
law, such for example as in computing good time available after revocation of parole (see Gilstrap v. Clemmer, 284 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1960)), or
in other matters (see Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919, 922 (N.D. Cal.
1959)) would hardly seem to justify a court in implying a further disparity,
especially, (a) when the language of the law does not require it, and (b)
there is no imaginable rhyme or reason for the difference.
86. Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332, 334 (3d Cir. 1960). The court
observed that "the change in the District of Columbia Code was considered
and reported to the Congress by the District of Columbia Committees of
the respective Houses while the revision of Title 18 of U.S.C. came out
of the Judiciary Committees." Id. at 334 n.4.
87. The Court cited with approval the decision in United States ex rel.
McCreary v. Kenton, 190 F. Supp. 689 (D. Conn. 1960) which, while
denying it was error to refuse to hear parolee's counsel and witnesses,
reversed a parole revocation order as being based on an unfair hearing.
88. 60 Stat. 237, 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958).
89. § 2(a), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1958) defines
"agency" in terms which appear to embrace the Federal Parole Board. It
is defined as an authority of the Government of the United States other
than Congress, the courts or territorial governments. Certain agencies are
excluded from the act, except for the requirements of § 3, Public Information. But though the list of those excluded appears to be inclusive and the
exceptions defined both in general terms (e.g., courts martial, wartime mili-
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gument has been rejected on all occasions." One basis has been
that the laws governing parole "bristle with discretion" and the
"full dress procedure it requires would render it practically impossible for the Board to handle its business."'" The issue, however,
is whether the single provision of section 6(a) respecting counsel
is applicable. The hearing procedures and judicial review provisions in sections 7 and 10, respectively, could readily be distin-

guished from the requirements of section 6(a). Indeed, while
these latter sections contain exceptions in virtue of which parole
board proceedings could plausibly be excluded,9 2 section 6 does
not. Judge Goodrich took perhaps a more candid view in asserting: "Nor can we believe that the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C.A. § 1005, was ever intended to cover this kind of a
case." 93 If "intent" is what the legislators were actually thinking
about there is no doubt much to the judge's point-correctional
agencies have traditionally been regarded as outside the adminis-

trative law, and there is not the slightest indication that anyone
was thinking about the Parole Board when the Act was enacted.

But if "intent" is taken to mean the generalized purpose and fundamental conceptions underlying the statutory scheme it is less
tary authority) and by naming specific agencies (e.g., functions conferred
under Selective Service Act, Contract Settlement Act) there is no language
which would exclude the Parole Board. Further, where Congress has meant
to exclude an agency, it has often done so in the law creating the agency.
"Since the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, at least
10 statutes have contained exceptions from all but the public information
or the judicial review requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act."
COMMISSION

ON

ORGANIZATION

OF

THE

xECUTIVE

BRANCH

OF

THE

Gov'T, TASK FoRcE REP. ON LEGAL SERWCEs AND PRAC. 142-43 (1955).
90. Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960); Bozell v. United
States, 199 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1952); Hiatt v. Campagna, 178 F.2d 42
(5th Cir. 1949), affd without opinion by equally divided court, 340 U.S.
880 (1950); United States ex rel. De Lucia v. O'Donovan, 82 F. Supp. 435
(N.D. Ill. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1949).
91. See Hiatt v. Campagna, supra note 90, at 45.
92. § 7, 60 Stat. 241 (1946) 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958): "In hearings which
section 1003 [Rule making] or 1004 [Adjudication] . . . requires to be
conducted pursuant to this section-(a) [Presiding Officers.-] There shall
preside at the taking of evidence [certain officials]; but nothing in this
chaptershall be deemed to supersede the conduct of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially
provided for by or designated pursuant to statute." Assuming the emphasized language refers to proceedings before persons of peculiar competence
beyond that of trial examiners provided for by the act, parole boards would
seem properly excluded. See Note, 65 HA v. L. REv. 309, 318 (1951). But
it is not clear (though it is plainly arguable) that this exception applies to
the counsel provisions of § 6 as well as to the presiding officer provisions
of § 7 and, perhaps, the provisions of §§ 4 & 5.
§ 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958): "Except so far as (1)
statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed
to agency discretion.-[provisions for judicial review]."
93. Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1960).
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clear that the provision for counsel has no application to parole
boards.
A recent development will probably postpone indefinitely any
Supreme Court determination of the foregoing legal issues involved in the denial of the right to counsel at federal parole revocation hearings. On April 24, 1961, the United States Board of
Parole adopted a new rule permitting representation by counsel

of choice at parole revocation hearings. That rule reads as follows:
All federal prisoners who have been returned to custody as parole
or mandatory release violators under a Board warrant shall be advised
that they may be represented by counsel at the revocation hearing provided that they arrange for such counsel in accordance with Board
procedure.
All prisoners in custody as violators previously given revocation
"hearings" without being afforded the opportunity for representation
by counsel shall be given an opportunity for a hearing with counsel. 4

What prompted this departure from a 50 year old practice,
upheld by most courts which passed upon it, can only be guessed.
In view, however, of the fact that the new rule was promulgated
shortly after of writ of certiorari was filed from the decision of the
third circuit in Washington v. Hagan upholding the past practice
of the Board, and in view of the Solicitor General's memorandum
in response to that petition," it would seem a fair inferenco
that the Board heeded the advice of government attorneys.90
The federal courts' view that neither fifth amendment due process nor the sixth amendment create a right to be represented at
94. Quoted in Memorandum for the Respondent, p. 4, Washington v.
Hagan, Supreme Court Docket No. 973 Misc., Oct. Term, 1960. See also
the remarks of Chairman Chappell of the U.S. Board of Parole at the Conference on Improving Career Opportunities for Lawyers in the Administration of Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, Summer, 1961.
95. The government argued against the grant of the writ on the issue
of the statutory right to counsel at parole revocation hearings on the
ground that despite a conflict between the District of Columbia and the
third circuit on this issue the changed rules of the Board deprived the issue of any substantial importance.
96. Cf. Glenn v. Reed, 289 F.2d 462, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1961) in which
Judge Edgerton stated: "The government rightly concedes the hearing and
revocation were invalid because appellant neither had nor was offered
counsel." It must be stated, however, that the issue argued by the government in this case was simply that a prisoner who was not represented by
counsel at his original parole revocation hearing but was subsequently offered the opportunity to be represented by counsel at a new hearing is not
entitled to be released from detention. While the argument impliedly accepts the right to representation by counsel at revocation hearings, the government was not really in a position to contend otherwise in the District of
Columbia Circuit. As for the reported government concession of the right
to have counsel offered, it can only be said that this surprising concession
(even the District of Columbia Circuit has never so held) does not appear to have been made in the government's brief. Brief for Appellees,
Glenn v. Reed, 289 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

1961]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

parole revocation, even by counsel of choice, obviously precludes
collateral attack on fourteenth amendment due process grounds

of denials of right to counsel by state boards. But one decision to
the contrary, although not dealing with counsel explicitly, is note-

worthy for its uniqueness. In Fleenor v. Hammond,9 7 the sixth
circuit held that a Kentucky Governor's revocation of a conditional
pardon with neither notice nor opportunity to be heard, pursuant
to state statute, was violative of the fourteenth amendment. The
court recognized that the Governor's granting of the release was
an act of grace and his decision to revoke final and conclusive
upon the courts. However,
upon the granting of a pardon, albeit conditionally, the convict was
entitled to his liberty and possessed of a right which could be forfeited
only by reason of a breach of the conditions of his grant.... To
hold that such forfeiture may be imposed without giving the grantee
an opportunity to be heard, does violence to what are said to be "immutable principles of justice, which inhere in the very idea of free government, which no member of the Union can disregard." 93

The court does not deal with the counsel question, but its moral is

plain enough.
The state law governing the right to counsel in parole revoca-

tion proceedings parallels that applicable to probation revocation,
although in some instances distinctions have been implied or drawn
between the considerations applicable to parole, as distinguished
from probation revocations." Occasionally there is an echo of the
extreme Fleenor v. Hammond view; 10 equally occasionally a stat97. 116 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1941).

98. Id. at 896. See the approving comment by Weihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing, 32 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 531 (1942).
99. Compare MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.2310 (1954) which allows representation by counsel in parole revocation, except where the violation
is- breach of the Michigan law, with MIcr. STAT. ANN. § 28.1134, which
makes no provision for counsel in probation revocation, and People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912) rejecting constitutional challenge
against the statute for failure to provide for confrontation, counsel, etc. Also compare Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937) (upholding
parole revocation without notice and hearing) with Lester v. Foster, 207
Ga. 596, 63 S.E.2d 402 (1951) (invalidating probation revocation without
notice and hearing and overruling prior probation cases but not mentioning
the prior handling of the parole revocation issue). See also McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945) which distinguished between the
hearing requirements for parole and probation revocation on the ground
that the latter, being 'a judicial act, requires judicial processes, and Ex
Parto Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 439, 229 P.2d 633, 646, 29 A.L.R.2d 1051,
1067 (1951). The Utah Supreme Court has more recently abandoned the
distinction. Blaine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P.2d 554 (1959), noted
in 7 UTAH L. Rnv. 125 (1960). For differences in procedure for parole and
probation revocation proposed by the Model Penal Code, see note 127 infra.
100. People ex rel. Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359, 90 N.E. 118 (1909);
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ute will provide the privilege of representation by counsel at the
0 ' more often statutes make provision for some sort of
hearing; 11
hearing' which some courts construe as bestowing a privilege of
being represented by one's own counsel;1 3 in a large number of
jurisdictions the applicable statute imposes no requirement of a
hearing in revocation proceedings." 4 Some evidence of the actual
practice of parole boards is furnished by the answers to a questionnaire circulated by the Reporter for the Model Penal Code
which revealed that some twelve parole boards conducted hearings without specific statutory authorization, though often at the
same time denying the parolee has any right to a hearing.' Further, it appears to be the practice in about 18 states whose statutes do not provide for counsel, to permit a parolee to advise with
counsel in preparation for his hearing;'O" in eight of these counsel is permitted at the hearing as well.' 0 7 Appointment of counsel
State ex rel. Murray v. Swenson, 196 Md. 222, 76 A.2d 150 (1950). Statutory interpretation was an adequate alternate ground in both cases since a
statute in each state provided for a hearing. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 808
(Smith-Hurd 1935); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 115 (1957). See also People
v. Moore, 62 Mich. 496, 29 N.W. 80 (1886).
101. ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 12 (1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.23 (Supp.
1960); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.2310 (1954); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6291
(26) (Supp. 1960). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.25 (Supp. 1960)
which provides that a parolee may consult counsel of his own selection, presumably in advance of the revocation hearing. This approximates the MoDEL PENAL CODE § 305.21 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). [Now renumbered
as § 305.16.]
102. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-417 (1956); GA. CODE
ANN. § 77-519 (Supp. 1958); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.9 (Supp.
1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:46 (1955); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 218
(Supp. 1960); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoC. ANN. art. 781d (Supp. 1960);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-62-16 (1953). Several states have recently amended their law to provide for a hearing where none was theretofore required.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 439.440 (1960); MISS. CODE ANN. § 4004-13 (1956);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 549.265 (Supp. 1960); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 949838 (Supp.1959).
103. Warden v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957); Stewart
v. Warden, 212 Md. 657, 659, 129 A.2d 89, 90 (1957) ("We assume without deciding that the right to counsel at a hearing on violation of the
condition of suspension is the same as at a trial."); State v. Boggs, 49
Del. 277, 114 A.2d 663 (1955); cases cited supra note 100.
104. ARK. STAT. ANN § 43-2802 (1947); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-228
(1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1532 (1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 247.9
(1946); MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 148 (1957); NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.150
(1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-61.1 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 144.370
(1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-8-18 (1956); S.D. CODE § 13.5307
(Supp. 1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 904 (1958); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 57.06 (Supp. 1961); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-326 (1957).
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.21, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
106. Ibid. (I have excluded from the comment's list of 23, those 5 jurisdictions whose statutes authorize legal representation.)
107. Ibid. For a survey of an earlier day see 4 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES

245-48 (1939).
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for indigent parolees is, needless to say, required nowhere, but it
appears to be the practice to make such appointments in several
states. 108
I1.

AN EVALUATION

The marginal legal recognition given to representation by attorneys in the crucial stages of the criminal process in which decisions of the greatest impact upon the life of the offender are made
is a matter of grave concern to those who value the contribution
which lawyers can make to the better administration of the criminal law. What is of equal concern is that the lack of legal recognition is itself a reflection of a profound conviction in many quarters that neither the lawyer nor the system of values he represents
have any useful role in the peno-correctional processes. As we have
seen, the responsibility for dispositions of the offender after guilt
are distributed between judicial and administrative agencies. Not
surprisingly, it is in the latter areas, by and large representing the
institution of parole administration, that the greatest opposition
centers. In most areas of the criminal process where the problems
of counsel arise, the controversy centers around the challenge
of accommodating the adversary process within a regime of equal
protection; in short, the problem of appointment of counsel. In
the parole area, the controversy centers around an issue largely a
matter of history in most areas-the very privilege of being represented by one's own lawyer. The blanket refusal to hear a person
by counsel is in most aspects of our system felt to be antithetical
to basic notions of justice, whether the proceedings be civil, criminal °9 or administrative." 0 While the practice is occasionally
tolerated, as in administrative investigations,' there is there absent what is always present in correctional dispositions-the issuance of an order granting or denying liberty to the subject of the
inquiry. Yet, as we have seen, the bare privilege of legal representation is widely denied. Although the United States Board of Parole
108. This would seem to be so in Maryland and West Virginia according
to PROCEEDINGS OF THE 89TH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTION OF THE
Am. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N WORKSHOP V, ColN11. ON PAROLE BD. PROB-

83-84 (1959).
109. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932): "If in any case,

LEMS

civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to bear

a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him it reasonably may

not be doubtful that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing and,
therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense." The dictum was applied in Chandler v. Freytag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) and, most recently, in Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961).

110. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 6(a), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5

U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958).

111. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
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is apparently abandoning its 50 year old practice of refusing to
hear counsel in parole revocation matters, the same is not true of
many state parole boards. Indeed, to judge from the reported remarks at a recent American Correctional Association meeting,
some parole boards have made something of a mission out of keeping lawyers out of parole, going so far as to meet with state bar
representatives to discourage lawyers from accepting retainers for
parolees." 2
Moreover, this attitude toward law and lawyers in these processes is not confined to parole administrators and correctional
people. Note has already been made of Judge Goodrich's refusal
to construe the requirement of a hearing to include the privilege
of being heard through counsel, on the ground that "there is no
place for lawyer representation and lawyer opposition in the matter of revocation of parole."' n
In examining the basis of these positions, it is useful at the outset to consider matters of principle apart from matters of practicability. There is, of course, a risk of being unreal and visionary.
But there is also a danger that preoccupation with the expedient
and the practical may make a necessary, or partly avoidable, evil
seem itself desirable.
One common justification for the ostracism of the law and the
lawyer is that matters of dealing with offenders within the maximum limits established by the legislative penalty is altogether a
matter of grace and favor. No offender is entitled to anything except the maximum imprisonment appropriate to the crime for
which he was duly convicted. Parole and probation, then, are
fundamentally like the traditional prerogative of mercy-acts of
charity from a forgiving sovereign. While the argument is repeatedly made, generally in supporting a denial of legal processes against
constitutional attack, it is hard to believe that anyone really believes it. First of all, even if it is solely the quality of mercy which
is being dispensed, it is apparent that it is not a personal act of
grace by a reigning monarch, but a highly institutionalized system
administered to tens of thousands of offenders each year by hundreds of governmental officials. So administered in a democratic
community, even grace itself, it may be thought, must be dispensed
and withdrawn according to some sense of principle and order
and with some respect for the forms of procedural regularity associated with concepts of basic fairness. But more significantly,
112. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 89TH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTION
OF THE AM. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, WORKSHOP V, COMM. ON PAROLE BD.
PROBLEMS

83-84 (1959).

113. Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960). See also the
similar remarks of Judge Breitel in 33 ALI PROCEEDINGS 264-65 (1956).
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the institution of individualized treatment represented by the indeterminate sentence laws and the systems of probation and parole
are not remotely charity, but an integral part of our system of
criminal law. What Justice Holmes said of pardon is a fortiori
true of probation and parole:
A pardon [probation or parole] in our days is not a private act of

grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is part of the
Constitutional [statutory] scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better
served by inflicting less than what the judgment [statutory maximum]
fixed.3'

4

On this view, these laws are as much a part of the system of
general law for dealing with offenders as the statutory maximum
term-they have their purposes, their principles and their limitations. Indeed it may be said as well that an offender is entitled
prima facie to probation or to the statutory minimum rather than
to incarceration for the maximum term permitted;n 5 and also,
prima facie, that he is entitled to remain at liberty on parole or
probation until a violation of its provisions has been clearly shown.
In a word, these laws are part of a system of justice rather than
acts of aberrational mercy which we indulge ourselves, and as such
can hardly be viewed as being properly administered outside the
framework of the legal order appropriate to other laws.
This suggests the more substantial basis for the nonlegal approach to correctional dispositions. This is that the processes of
individualization of punishment, by withholding imprisonment, or
releasing from prison, or withdrawing a suspension or release
once granted, require judgments of a kind which are more appropriately made by officials who are expert in these matters, unfettered either by the legal proscription of generalized standards,
or of procedures for the determination of facts respecting particular offenders.
The view is exemplified in the following observation made in
connection with revocation proceedings, but a fortiori applicable
in release determinations:
Mhe board undoubtedly takes into consideration impressions of the

suspected parolee that it gained in the manner just indicated. It analyzes symptoms and character rather than weighs evidence. It is required to determine a non-legal problem; that is, whether the parolee is

about to become a recusant. A prudent performance of a board member's duty may call for intuition rather than for a knowledge of the
114. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).

115. See Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code,

109 U. PA. L. Rnv. 465, 470,486-87 (1961).
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rules of procedure, and for training in the social sciences rather than
a course of study in a law school. 116

The problem of legal standards to govern the exercise of individualized correction is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper. However, the implications for procedural regularity, particularly as that involves a role for the lawyer, of the argument resting
on the needs of expert clinical judgment raise issues which are
central.
Before proceeding to deal with these issues one preliminary
observation is in order. Although the primary focus of this discussion is the role of counsel, it is apparent that the issue is inextricably involved with the role of the hearing. Without a hearing,
even of an informal kind, in which antagonistic facts can be rebutted and favorable ones presented, the role of counsel is inevitably
marginal. And without counsel, the benefit of a hearing to the subject of the inquiry is substantially reduced. The considerations
which follow concerning the role and use of counsel, therefore,
are predicated upon the availability of a meaningful hearing. And
what is said of the desirability of counsel necessarily attaches to
the grant of a hearing.
The obvious suggestion was made in the first part of this paper
that correctional dispositions fall into two categories distinguished by the degree of significance of particular factors of decision.
The sentencing determination, whether it be performed by the judge
after conviction or by a parole board in deciding when and whether
to release, entails a primary focus on the intangibles of the rehabilitative potential of the offender coupled with the needs of
society for protection and for vindication. Here, one would suppose, the range of the relevant reaches its apogee and the grounds
of judgment rest maximally on the expertise of the professional
clinical judgment. By contrast, however, commitment redeterminations, whether by a court to revoke probation or by an agency to
revoke parole, involve an inquiry of narrower ambit, whatever the
overlayer of discretion, of whether the releasee has complied with
standards of behavior which the judge or board expressly made
the condition of continued liberty. It is useful to consider separately the role of counsel in these two types of proceedings.
A.

SENTENCING-TYPE DETERMINATIONS

It would seem plain enough that the rigidity and formality of
the full blown processes of the adversary proceeding are not adequate to bring into focused consideration the imponderables involved in sentencing-type determinations. In these proceedings,
there is clearly need for discrete inquiries by investigators into the
116. Rossman, J. concurring in Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 450,
229 P.2d 633, 650, Annot., 29 A.L.R. 2d 1024 (1951).
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offender's history, judging and speculating by experts concerning
the significance of the offender's personality and a more active
role by the deciding tribunal than is contemplated in the ordinary adversary proceeding. But to say so much is not at all to say
that there is no room for participation by the offender in the processes of judgment with whatever help his lawyer can provide. To
argue as has Commissioner Bates that sentencing determinations
do not raise a "forensic question" and that "it is not a question of
law"'1 misses the point, since the lawyer's contribution is not
limited to his knowledge of the law but extends to his professional
skill in the complicated processes of fact determinations. If matters of fact were irrelevant to the inquiry, the argument against
counsel would have greater force. Indeed, this seems to have
been Judge Breite's thought in joining Commissioner Bates' opposition to providing for the right to assistance of counsel at parole release hearings in the American Law Institute. He observed:
A Parole Board does not determine facts and principles and rules in

any way at all, as we do either before an administrative agency or a
court. The hearings that they actually conduct are not for the purpose
of ascertaining the truth as an issue. It is to make a discretionary,

inside-the-system determination whether a man should be retained or

released.1"8

But surely factual truth is not irrelevant to such an inquiry. Whatever validity the correctional judgment has rests at bottom upon the
assumption of a pattern of facts concerning the offender's personality and history. What were in fact all the relevant circumstances
surrounding personal difficulties the offender has had? What are
the facts relevant to his past brushes with the law? How significant
factually is his record of prior arrests? What elements in his history suggest a favorable prognosis? These are matters of fact; to
say that the decider has other means than the hearing to discover
these facts is not to say that the offender has no legitimate interest
in seeing to it that the decider makes determinations upon a factual
record which does justice to the offender, as he sees it, and which
is free of outright error. The usefulness of counsel in assisting the
offender in insuring fullness and accuracy of the factual record, in
presenting aspects and implications of the facts favorable to him,
and in guarding against unfavorable implications, let alone rumor
and overhasty conclusions, seems hardly debatable. His help, it
may be added, is particularly needed in view of the obvious fact
that the average offender is commonly ill-equipped, in terms of
117. 33 ALI PROCEEDINGs 261 (1956).

118. Id. at 264. See also Rossman L, concurring in Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 448, 229 P.2d 633, 649 (1951).
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education,
articulateness and situation, to carry the burden him119
self.
Moreover, the uses of counsel are not limited to the fact resolving function which underlies the proper exercise of the expert
clinical judgment of the court or agency in evaluating the reformative potential of the offender. In virtually all cases, to some degree, and in certain cases, like the sex offender, to a significantly
large degree, the judgment turns upon the weightiness of considerations of retribution, moral reprobation, community reassurance
or deterrence as to which in no realistic sense is there called into
play the expert professional judgment of the decider."' The very
subjectivism of this type of judgment would appear to make altogether useful the kind of search into basic values and into their
application in the circumstances of the offender toward which
able counsel might readily contribute.
Of course, even granting the help a lawyer may render in behalf of the offender there is still the question whether it is desirable that he be permitted to have it. But it is a question to which
basic considerations of fairness and justice appear to require an
affirmative answer. There is no apparent reason why there should
*be abandoned in the area of sentencing or paroling offenders the
traditional value, associated closely with the root idea of a democratic community, that a person should be given an opportunity
to participate effectively in determinations which affect his liberty.
Indeed, the cultivation of a sense of fair dealing in the offender
would appear to be helpful, if not essential, in attaining one of
the principal goals of these correctional processes, the rehabilitation
of the offender. All this would be so even if judges and parole
boards were, unlike all other individuals in authority, paragons of
virtue and infallibility. In fact, of course, the often inexpert character of correctional agencies, the oft-cited biases of occasional
parole board members, the pressure of work under which case investigators and boards work 2' would seem to make particularly
welcome to the conscientious court or agency whatever added assurance of accuracy and fairness is contributed by the participation
of the offender and his lawyer in the processes of decision.
There is another, though subtler, contribution which a lawyer
can make to the integrity of the sentencing or parole decision. This
is the influence he can exert toward more rational decision mak119. See the observations of Mr. James V. Bennett, Director of the federal Bureau of Prisons, 33 ALI PROCEEDINGS 262 (1956). See generally
Tappan, The Role of Counsel in Parole Matters, 3 PRAc. LAw 21 (Feb.
1957).

120. It is well known, for example, that sex offenders as a class are
marked by both a very low recidivism rate and a very low parole rate.
121. See Tappan, supra note 119, at 25.

19613

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

ing. It is, of course, true that what judgment the decider finally
makes on the basis of the factual record is altogether a matter of
discretion. There is, in this area, nothing resembling legal rules
which require a given disposition on a showing of a given set of
facts. Yet, unless the judgments are to be regarded as totally
whimsical, they must be made with more or less consistency in response to some conceptions or principles which transcend the subjective feelings generated by the circumstances of the particular
case. It has traditionally been the role of the lawyer in the common
law system to participate actively in evolving legal principles out of
a pattern of case by case adjudication in which the governing
structure or principle is at first only dimly, partially or not at all
perceived. Lawyers can be nettling and tiresome in demanding reasoned and supportable conclusions, responsive to the assumptions
of principle implicit in past decisions. But that surely is a small
price to pay for the impetus to careful, sound and consistent consideration of the elements of decision. It would seem to me fundamentally fallacious to argue, as has Judge Breitel, that only after
several decades of experience when governing standards have become determined will there be an important function for lawyers
to provide m This ignores two significant considerations. In the
first place, the very absence or anarchy of standards presents the
maximum need for whatever protection a lawyer can provide
against arrant subjectivism and arbitrariness, given the absence of
substantive legal control created by the lack of standards.? In
the second place, the argument ignores the fundamental contribution which lawyers can make toward the evolvement of generalized grounds of decision.
Some, perhaps, may feel it visionary to contemplate the lawyer's
role as the inculcation of principle and coherence into the anarchy
of sentencing and parole decisions. Even so, a significance of

counsel, particularly before parole boards, is that his very presence
tends to demand answerability. Under the pressures of an intoler122. 33 ALI PROCEEDINGS 265 (1956).

123. Compare the observations of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950), where the Court sustained the constitutionality of a state statute, vesting in the Governor

the authority to determine whether intervening insanity warranted reprieve

of a death sentence, without affording the prisoner an opportunity to be

heard. Speaking of "the tentative and dubious knowledge as to mental
diseases and the great strife of schools in regard to them" and "the treacherous uncertainties in the present state of psychiatric knowledge", Mr.
Justice Frankfurter implied that these factors added to the unfairness of
the ex parte determination. Id. at 24-25. He suggested that the evil of
"a hurried, one-sided, untested determination of the question of insanity"

was augmented by the fact that the answers "are as yet so wrapped in

confusion and conflict and so dependent on elucidation by more than onesided partisanship." Id. at 25.
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able work load and an almost impossible task, it is the human response for boards to fall into habits and routines which make their
daily task more readily manageable-cursory interviews, hasty reviews of reports, half-considered dispositions, handy but crude
rules of thumb to govern dispositions. Counsel, an outsider with
no involvement in the agency's problems, can be a healthy influence in the stimulus and challenge his very presence tends to
provide to continuing self-appraisal by the board of accepted routines and assumptions. What Professor Allen observed with respect
to counsel at juvenile proceedings is equally applicable to parole
proceedings: "[I]t is good for an institution to have on the premises persons sufficiently independent and sufficiently brash to
challenge, on occasion, the assumptions and methods of the institution. I know of no better therapy for the messianic com24
plex."1
Finally, it should be pointed out that the recognition of the
lawyer's role in parole determinations is rather the projection of
existing processes than the innovation of new ones. As was stated
earlier, full recognition is given to the lawyer's place in the judicial
sentencing procedures, ever since the advent of the wide-ranging
pre-sentence reports. Since parole determinations are in all relevant respects of principle of a similar order to sentencing determinations, recognition of a like place for counsel before parole
boards has the added virtue of consistency.
B.

REVOCATION DETERMINATIONS

In so far as the decision to revoke a conditional release, whether
probation or parole, turns upon considerations of clinical and professional judgment, all that was said concerning the role of counsel
in sentencing and parole release determinations is applicable here
124. The Borderland of the Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing"

Criminal Justice, 32 Soc. SERV. REv. 107, 119 (1959). Consider in this connection the remarks of Mr. Lee B. Mailler, Chairman of the New York
Board of Parole in the American Law Institute, Meeting of the American
Law Institute Group in Connection with the Model Penal Code, p. 11
(Dec. 21, 1956, Mimeographed Transcript):
There is no necessity for him [parole violator] to have counsel
to come back again if he has clearly violated his provisions of release.
There is no reason for him to come again before a Board of Parole
with an attorney to try and slip out of the violations which he has
committed. In the State of New York it has worked very well. The
Board of Parole at the present time has been conducting on an average
of 1000 parole hearings a month-in other words over 12,000 a year.
These people are dedicated men. They are not politically influenced in

any way, shape or form. If parolees or inmates of institutions could
feel they could have outside legal advice, either in the preparation for
their appearance before parole, or after they have transgressed and
are about to be brought back, it would weaken the whole system of
the operation of parole.
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as well. However, as was stated earlier, the determination to revoke and recommit because of conduct in violation of the conditions on which release was granted, involves, if not exclusively,
then at least centrally, the fairly narrowly focused issue of what
the conduct of the releasee actually was and whether it constituted
a violation of a stated condition, entitling the court or agency to
consider whether revocation is thereby indicated. Given the character of the issue to be determined and the fact that the continued
liberty of a person depends on the outcome, it is difficult to understand the view sometimes expressed that a lawyer has no proper
business in these matters. The central task of ascertaining whether
the prisoner has committed the acts alleged, and measuring the
acts proven against a standard to which he was obliged to conform is precisely the business of the criminal trial itself where the
right to the assistance of counsel has been recognized as one of
the "immutable principles of justice." Indeed, in many contested
revocation proceedings, the conduct charged actually constitutes
the commission of a criminal act. No doubt it is simpler and faster
for a court or a board to make the determination by whatever
means seem to it sufficient to persuade-whether it be an informal
talk with the parole officer or a brief interview with the prisoner
or a written report by an investigator. But it would seem patently
at war with the central concept of procedural justice to deny to a
person with his liberty at stake the opportunity to hear and meet
the specific charge against him with the benefit of counsel. The
force of the argument that the releasee owes his liberty to a beneficent act of grace and enjoys no right to his liberty, even where
the conditions of its grant have been complied with, has, unfortunately, precluded the application of the constitutional command
of due process.' There is all the more reason, therefore, for
courts and legislatures to recognize voluntarily the obligations of
common justice implicit in the claim for legal representation. Supporting a provision in the Model Penal Code requiring, in probation revocation, that the probationer be given notice and a hearing
at which he may introduce and controvert evidence and be represented by counsel, the Reporter's comment observes: "This is an
area where dangers of abuse are real and the normal procedural
protection proper. That a defendant has no right to the suspension or probation does not justify the alteration of his status by
methods that must seem and sometimes be unfair."' -" The point
is well taken, though it is not easy to see why, in principle, the argument did not carry the Model Penal Code to recognize the
125. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935); Burns v. United
States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
126. MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 301.4, comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
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appropriateness of similar guarantees in parole revocations before
lay agencies, where, it would seem, the dangers of abuse and unfairness are even greater.' 2 7 It would be unimaginable, for example, that any court would follow, in probation revocation proceedings, a practice which was carried on for years by the United
States Parole Board-not only declining to advise the releasee of
his privilege to hire counsel, but refusing to permit retained counsel to appear.
If concreteness is needed to establish the singular appropriateness of counsel both in probation and parole revocations, the records in many decided cases supply it forcefully. In Fleming v.
Tate,'28 parolee was sent back to prison to serve out the remaining 24 years of his original 40 year sentence because, while on
parole, he left the District of Columbia to attend his sister's funeral
in Virginia in violation of a condition that he should not leave the
District without the written permission of the board. His claim
that he obtained permission from his parole sponsor was rebuffed
with the suggestion that he should have gotten permission from
an employee of the board. The board revoked for failure to get
permission from the proper party, rather than failure to get it in
writing from the board as the condition required, after refusing to
hear the testimony of his parole sponsor or to allow his counsel
to appear. Not surprisingly the court took this occasion to hold
that the board's practice of not permitting counsel or witnesses at
parole revocation hearings was in violation of the statutory grant
of a hearing.
In Moore v. Reid,'29 a person conditionally released after earning good time credit was summarily arrested and delivered to jail
for "associating" with persons having a criminal background in
violation of a condition of his parole. As the court read the record, parolee manifested a complete misapprehension of his conditional status as a releasee, and failed to appreciate the significance of the hearing before the Examiner or the extent of the latter's authority. Further, the criminal "association" took the form
127. The Model Penal Code, although providing for notice, hearing

and opportunity to rebut and present evidence in parole as well as proba-

tion revocation proceedings, provides in the former only that the parolee
may "advise with his own legal counsel." MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.21

(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). [Now renumbered as § 305.16.] Another notable difference in the Model Penal Code's treatment of probation and
parole revocation is that while in the former an actual conviction of a
crime is required for revocation, in the latter it is sufficient that the parole
board itself determine that the parolee committed a crime. Compare MoDEL PENAL CODE § 301.3 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) (probation revocation)
with MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.21 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956) [renumbered § 305.16] (parole revocation).
128. 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
129. 246 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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of parolee writing innocent letters and post cards, though under

alias, to a former cellmate, apparently not fully aware until after
the event that he was authoritatively forbidden to do so. The court
itself took the view that the condition was not susceptible to interpretation that sending the communications constituted an association with improper persons. Indeed, the parole officer's misinterpretation appeared itself to be something of a ruse since he later
testified that he suspected the appellant might be laying the foundation for a prison break. The court observed that, "If ever a
lawyer30 were needed, it would seem that this appellant needed
one."
In United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton,3 1 the court declined to follow. the District of Columbia view that right to counsel
was implicit in the grant of a hearing, but reversed a parole revocation with observations that shake the court's premise:
The transcript discloses that the Board member, after identifying
the prisoner, asked one question-the one which the Member herself
was supposed to answer----"How did you violate your release?" When
the prisoner said he wanted a chance to prove that he had been living
a decent life, he was not asked a single question about sources of information or proof which he could point out which would exonerate
him or contradict the claimed violations. The prisoner's representations
were not discussed with him at all. The statute contemplates something132more than the sterile, pro-forma proceeding adopted in this
case.
m
As a final example, the proceedings in Hiatt v. Compagna"

bear mention, not as representative of common practice but as exemplative of the kind of abuse which can occur. In that case,
130. Id. at 657.
131. 190 F. Supp. 689 (D. Conn. 1960).
132. Id. at 691-92. Courts in probation revocation sometimes fall into
the same impatient and hurried inquiries. Compare the following verbatim
report of such a proceeding, In re Levi, 39 Cal. 2d 41, 43 n.1, 244 P.2d
403, 404 n.1 (1942):
'The Court: People v. Eddie D. Levi.
"Mr. Levi, they tell me you have had some more trouble since you were
out.
'The Defendant: I went to Pedro to my brother's'The Court: You got into some sort of a drunken brawl?
'The Defendant: No. They say I was drunk.
'The Court: Yes. Your wife has never come out here and your children
are still back in Chicago, is that correct?
"The Defendant: Sure.
'The Court: Well, because of the serious nature of your offense and because the Court specifically admonished you that you were not under any
circumstances to use intoxicating liquor and because you rewarded the consideration that was given you by going out and getting drunk within five
days after your release, your probation is revoked."
133. 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), affd without opinion by equally divided court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950).
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according to testimony of some board members before a congressional committee, no grounds for revocation of parole existed; yet,
the board agreed to act on congressional recommendations for

revocation, a widescale campaign of publicity having been launched against the parolees. The incident led a dissenting judge in
the Court of Appeals to observe:
Neither adverse newspaper criticism of the granting of parole or a
demand or request by a subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department of Congress can lawfully supplant
the requirement of the statute for "reliable information of violation of
parole....
Neither newspapers, sub-committees, political repercussions, whims, or capriciousness, singly or collectively, without more,
justifies the incarceration or re-incarceration of an individual longer
than it is reasonably necessary 134
to afford him a full and fair hearing
on charges adduced against him.

There is one last point relevant to the use of counsel in revocation proceeding, which transcends the values of justice and fairness
as ends in themselves and as safeguards against abuse. It has not
escaped those who have been concerned with the institution of procedural regularity that one of its prime contributions is as a psychological stabilizer; acceptance of law is substantially furthered
to the extent that those subject to its rule observe its workings with
consistent, scrupulous fairness. The inculcation of a similar sense
on the part of those subject to the correctional laws tends to further, therefore, the very readaptation to the norms of society which
it is the ultimate purpose of these laws to achieve. As stated by
Justice Prettyman:
The parole system is an enlightened effort on the part of society to
rehabilitate convicted criminals. Certainly no circumstance could further that purpose to a greater extent than a firm belief on the part of
such offenders in the impartial, unhurried, objective, and thorough
processes of the machinery of the law. And hardly any circumstance
could with greater effect impede progress toward the desired end than
a belief on their part that the machinery of the law is arbitrary, technical, too busy, or impervious to facts. The crisis in the rehabilitation of
these men may very well be the treatment which they receive when
accused of an act violative of the terms of what must be to them a
135
precious privilege.
134. 178 F.2d at 47-48. On remand the district court discharged petitioners from custody on the ground that the revocation orders were arbitrary, unsupported by evidence and total nullities, stating: "The parole system, which marks a great and wise advance in penology, will lose public
confidence and effectiveness unless it is administered with independence,
courage, fairness and justice. The courts as well as the Board should be
alert to safeguard against arbitrary action." Campagna v. Hiatt, 100 F.
Supp. 74, 81 (N.D. Ga. 1951).
135. Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See also
State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 303, 259 Pac. 1044, 1046 (1927).
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CONSIDERATIONS OF PRACTICABILITY

The final and inevitable inquiry is whether it is practical and
feasible to authorize representation by counsel in parole and revocation proceedings, given the actual circumstances surrounding the
working of these institutions, however desirable it appears in principle to do so. Here it is necessary to consider separately the making
of these determinations by courts and administrative agencies.
So far as judicial determinations are concerned-sentencing, probation grants and probation revocations-there appear to be no
'considerations of practicality not applicable to the criminal trial
itself. Indeed, the argument of convenience is rarely made. It is
where determinations are made by parole agencies-granting or
revoking parole-that the practical consequences of recognizing
the right to counsel are principally adduced. n6
A common objection derives from the apprehension that parole
agencies, already burdened with caseloads that place a maximum
strain upon their institutional capabilities, might ultimately falter
under the added delays and prolongations which representation by
counsel would entail. Some of this objection is quite real. The
presence of counsel would, no doubt, serve as a formidable obstacle to such saving short-cuts as the two-minute interview and
the out of hand revocation to which some boards have been led
by institutional and personal pressures. And no doubt as well,
average time devoted to the ordinary parole or revocation hearing

at which counsel is present might be appreciably more than that
at which only the offender is present. This, however, is to be

counted as an advantage rather than a disadvantage, for the reasons earlier suggested. The problems of overburdened parole
136. Considerations of practicality probably led the Model Penal Code
to the disparity stated supra note 127 of granting the right to representation
by counsel at the hearing in probation revocation, though not in parole
revocation. According to the Reporter it was indeed such considerations
which led him not to propose the right to representation by counsel in
parole release hearings. See remarks of Professor Wechsler in 33 ALI
PROCEEDINGS 259 (1956). As originally proposed, MODEL PENAL CoDE

§ 305.11(2) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956) provided: "A prisoner shall be permitted to advise with his own legal counsel in preparing for a hearing before the Board of Parole." After a spirited exchange of views at the 33d
Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (PROCEEDINGS, supra at
258-67), an amendment was voted (by a 21-19 vote) to provide: "The
prisoner shall be entitled to advise with his own legal counsel in preparing
for a hearing before the Board of Parole, and shall be entitled to have assistance of counsel at such a hearing, subject to control by the Board as
to any abuse of that privilege." (Emphasis added.) The council reconsidered the question at its March 1957 meeting and resolved to recommend that
the Institute reconsider its action and approve the following formulation,
as § 305:7(2): "A prisoner shall be permitted to advise with any persons
whose assistance he reasonably desires, including his own legal counsel, in
preparing for a hearing before the Board of Parole."
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boards would appear remediable by measures directed to the problem rather than by the pursuit of measures which render the
work of the boards less just and less adequate.
On the other hand, some of the apprehension that lawyers
would bog down the system is less than real, stemming from the
layman's traditional distrust of lawyers as masters of the art of
frustration, sworn to advance the cause of their client rather than
the truth and hence prime instigators of delay and diversion.137
For the reasons suggested earlier, this view is a somewhat primitive distortion of the significance of counsel in the adversary proceeding. But to the extent that there is some basis for this concern, it would hardly appear necessary to bar entry to lawyers to
allay it. The issue is not whether the lawyer's paraphernalia of
technicalities appropriate to other areas are proper in parole matters; no one has seriously suggested that rules of pleading and
evidence should be imported into parole hearings. The issue is
whether the attorney may speak for his client, given the areas of
relevance of parole and revocation proceedings and always subject
to the authority of the agency to draw the ground rules. A sensible
and pragmatic adaptation of the nature of legal advocacy to the
needs and purposes of the inquiry is as plausible in parole as it
has proven to be in such "non-legal" areas as labor arbitration
and the regulatory and adjudicative work of administrative agencies.
Furthermore, these arguments-based on the delay and confusion which lawyers would introduce-are apparently founded
on the assumption that to recognize the right of offenders to retain counsel at parole or revocation hearings will inevitably lead
great numbers of offenders to take advantage of the right. No evidence has been adduced to indicate that this has happened in the
jurisdictions which recognize such a right in revocation proceedings; given the dedicated animus to lawyers of many articulate
parole administrators the omission of proof is itself telling. Indeed
it has been indicated by the Chairman of the Michigan Parole
Board that although the right to counsel in revocation proceedings, other than those based on conviction of crime, was created by
statute in 1937, in only a handful of the thousand or so revocations each year has the offender elected to appear at a hearing
with counsel.' 38 Maryland has apparently had a similar experi137. See generally Swisher, The Supreme Court and the "Moment of

Truth", 54 THE AMER. POL. Sci. REv. 879 (1960).

138. Remarks of Mr. Ross Pascoe to Summer Research Training Institute on the Administration of Criminal Justice, Madison, Wisconsin, Summer
1960.
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ence. A synopsis of a recent American Correctional Association
workshop on parole board problems reveals:
In Maryland, their Court of Appeals has ruled that all persons returned
as violators are entitled to an attorney. Maryland provides a form for
each inmate to determine if he desires this service and it was indi-

eated that very few have taken advantage of this right.Y3 9

Since only a rare statute or two affords the right to be represented
by counsel at parole release proceedings there is no way of estimating what impetus to. obtaining counsel such a statutory recognition would create in the prison -community. But for whatever it
is worth there is no evidence of a mass retention of counsel in
those jurisdictions where boards permit counsel as a matter of
practice.
Of course, there is inevitably a strong moral and practical pressure, once the right to counsel is recognized, to extend the benefit
of that right to all who claim it, whether or not they can afford it,
through provisions for the appointment of counsel. And given the
multitude of parole and revocation proceedings it may prove inordinately expensive and otherwise impractical for the state to provide counsel. It may be that one answer lies in expanding the duties of public defenders, to include parole board representation."' 0
In all events, this is a problem which inheres in the dilemma of
adhering to an adversary process without offending principles of
equal protection for the great majority who lack the resources to
obtain its benefits. It is precisely the problem which exists with regard to counsel at the trial itself; indeed, it is the overriding problem. It is hardly .a proper solution to the institutional inadequacies
which create the problem to deprive those who can obtain counsel
of their right to do so. Financial inability to hire counsel when the
need is legally recognized may well create a sense of unfairness
and perhaps a degree of hopelessness in inmates and parolees
and this may operate adversely to the rehabilitative end. But it is
a matter of balancing gains and losses, and one may reasonably
find a greater injustice and obstacle to reform in the blanket refusal to permit representation by counsel, especially in view of the
contributions to the integrity of the parole process itself which the
presence of retained cpunsel tends to inake.
The final practical objection to counsel at parole matters may
be-stated--as follows: -What kind of attorney, it is asked, will be
attracted to practice "bef6-re prole boards? Judging from the character of many attorneys who specialize in minor matters in the
139. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 89a
OF THE AM. CORRECTIONAL

ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTION

Ass'N, WORKSHOP V,

COMmnTTEE ON PA-

ROLE BD.PROBLEMS 83 (1959).
140. See the Minnesota Public Defender statute, supra note 50.
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criminal courts it is not unreasonable to suppose that the same
"jail-house lawyer" type will be the ones typically called upon to
represent prisoners and parolees. Persons of this calibre have done
little to impart integrity into the processes of the criminal trial and
it is not likely they would do so in parole proceedings. The average offender generally possesses a jaundiced view of the workings
of the institutions of criminal justice, tending to regard the fix, or
at least influence, as of inestimably more significance than the
merits of the case. The fear is that the type of lawyer who will
specialize in these matters will feed upon and encourage this attitude, thus converting legal representation into a commercial relationship in which, in the offender's mind, if not sometimes in actuality, liberty is bought by paying a fee.'
There is no doubt much to the argument. It is particularly in
the administration of criminal justice in this country that the bar
as a group has failed to discharge its responsibilities. The highest
minded and the most competent are not, as a group, the lawyers
most attracted to criminal work. The jail-house lawyer is a reality
and not a bogeyman of parole administrators. But the presence of
many bad lawyers is not a dispositive argument, any more in
parole proceedings than in criminal trials, for excluding all lawyers.
The unhappy inadequacies of some lawyers, whether manifested
by influence peddling, venality and incompetency, or narrow contentiousness and obstreperousness are amenable to measures short
of the totally self-destroying remedy of closing the door to all legal representation. The challenge is to the bar as well as to the
agencies involved, a challenge eloquently put in general terms in
the Report on Professional Responsibility of the Joint Conference
of the American Bar Association and the American Association
of Law Schools:
The lawyer's highest loyalty is . . . the most intangible. It is a loyalty that runs, not to persons, but to procedures and institutions. The
lawyer's role imposes on him a trusteeship for the integrity of those
fundamental processes of government and self-government upon which
the successful functioning of our society depends.
All institutions, however sound in purpose, present temptations to
interested exploitation, to abusive short cuts, to corroding misinterpretations. The forms of democracy may be observed while means are
found to circumvent inconvenient consequences resulting from a compliance with those forms. A lawyer recreant to his responsibilities can
so disrupt the hearing of a cause as to undermine those rational foun141. For examples of the argument I have tried to describe see comments to National Probation and Parole Association, Standard Probation
and Parole Act, as quoted in Turnbladh, A Critique of the Model Penal
Code Sentencing Proposals, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 544, 551-52
(1958), and the statements of Commissioner Sanford Bates in 33 ALI
PROCEEDINGS 259-67 (1956).
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dations without which an adversary proceeding loses its meaning and
its justification. Everywhere democratic and constitutional government
is tragically dependent on voluntary and understanding co-operation in
the maintenance of its fundamental processes and forms.
It is the lawyer's duty to preserve and advance this indispensable
cooperation by keeping alive the willingness to engage in it and by imparting the understanding necessary to give it direction and effectiveness. This is a duty that attaches not only to his private practice, but
to his relations with the public. In this matter he is not entitled to take
public opinion as a datum by which to orient and justify his actions.
He has an affirmative duty to help shape the growth and development
of public attitudes toward fair procedures and due process.
Without this essential leadership, there is an inevitable tendency for
practice to drift downward to the level of those who have the least
understanding of the issues at stake, whose experience of life has not
taught them the vital importance of preserving just and proper forms
of procedure. It is chiefly for the lawyer that the term "due process"
takes on tangible meaning, for whom it indicates what is allowable
and what is not, who realizes what a ruinous cost is incurred when its
demands are disregarded. For the lawyer the insidious dangers contained in the notion that "the end justifies the means" is not a matter
of abstract philosophic conviction, but of direct professional experience.
If the lawyer fails to do his part in educating the public to these dangers, he fails in one of his highest duties.1 42

142. Reprinted at 44 A.B.AJ. 1159, 1162, 1216 (1958).

